Security of Information, Threat Intelligence, Hacking, Offensive Security, Pentest, Open Source, Hackers Tools, Leaks, Pr1v8, Premium Courses Free, etc

  • Penetration Testing Distribution - BackBox

    BackBox is a penetration test and security assessment oriented Ubuntu-based Linux distribution providing a network and informatic systems analysis toolkit. It includes a complete set of tools required for ethical hacking and security testing...
  • Pentest Distro Linux - Weakerth4n

    Weakerth4n is a penetration testing distribution which is built from Debian Squeeze.For the desktop environment it uses Fluxbox...
  • The Amnesic Incognito Live System - Tails

    Tails is a live system that aims to preserve your privacy and anonymity. It helps you to use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship...
  • Penetration Testing Distribution - BlackArch

    BlackArch is a penetration testing distribution based on Arch Linux that provides a large amount of cyber security tools. It is an open-source distro created specially for penetration testers and security researchers...
  • The Best Penetration Testing Distribution - Kali Linux

    Kali Linux is a Debian-based distribution for digital forensics and penetration testing, developed and maintained by Offensive Security. Mati Aharoni and Devon Kearns rewrote BackTrack...
  • Friendly OS designed for Pentesting - ParrotOS

    Parrot Security OS is a cloud friendly operating system designed for Pentesting, Computer Forensic, Reverse engineering, Hacking, Cloud pentesting...
Showing posts with label #Snowden. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #Snowden. Show all posts

Monday, September 19, 2016

Secure Anonymous File Sharing - OnionShare





OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously share files of any size. It works by starting a web server, making it accessible as a Tor onion service, and generating an unguessable URL to access and download the files. It doesn’t require setting up a server on the internet somewhere or using a third party filesharing service. You host the file on your own computer and use a Tor onion service to make it temporarily accessible over the internet. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to download the file from you.

Features:
  • A user-friendly drag-and-drop graphical user interface that works in Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux
  • Ability to share multiple files and folders at once
  • Support for multiple people downloading files at once
  • Automatically copies the unguessable URL to your clipboard
  • Shows you the progress of file transfers
  • When file is done transferring, automatically closes OnionShare to reduce the attack surface
  • Localized into several languages, and supports international unicode filenames

When users want to send files, the program creates a password-protected, temporary website hosted on the Tor network—what’s known as a Tor Hidden Service—that runs on their computer. They provide the recipient with the URL and password for that site, preferably via a message encrypted with a tool like PGP or Off-The-Record encrypted instant messaging. The recipient visits that URL in a Tor Browser and downloads the file from that temporary, untraceable website, without needing to have a copy of Onionshare.

As soon as the person has downloaded the file, you can just cancel the web server and the file is no longer accessible to anyone.

"It’s basically 100 percent darknet."



How to Use

Before you can share files, you need to open Tor Browser in the background. This will provide the Tor service that OnionShare uses to start the onion service.

Open OnionShare and drag and drop files and folders you wish to share, and click Start Sharing. It will show you a .onion URL such as http://asxmi4q6i7pajg2b.onion/egg-cain and copy it to your clipboard. This is the secret URL that can be used to download the file you’re sharing. If you’d like multiple people to be able to download this file, uncheck the “close automatically” checkbox.

Send this URL to the person you’re trying to send the files to. If the files you’re sending aren’t secret, you can use normal means of sending the URL: emailing it, posting it to Facebook or Twitter, etc. If you’re trying to send secret files then it’s important to send this URL securely.

The person who is receiving the files doesn’t need OnionShare. All they need is to open the URL you send them in Tor Browser to be able to download the file.

Using the command line version

In Linux: Just run  onionshare from the terminal.
In Windows: Add C:\Program Files (x86)\OnionShare to your PATH. Now you can run onionshare.exe in a command prompt.
In Mac OS X: Run ln -s /Applications/OnionShare.app/Contents/MacOS/onionshare /usr/local/bin. Now you can run onionshare from the terminal.


Onionshare can be particularly useful when someone sending a file wants to remain anonymous even to the recipient. If whistleblowers can securely send an Onionshare URL and password to a journalist, they potentially could use it to leak secrets anonymously without being exposed. That flips the model of how Tor enables leaks: Sites like WikiLeaks and news organizations using the anonymous leak software SecureDrop host their own Tor Hidden Services. Onionshare could put more power in whistleblowers’ hands, helping them send secrets to journalists who don’t have that sort of anonymous submission system in place.

What it protects against

  • Third parties don’t have access to files being shared. The files are hosted directly on the sender’s computer and don’t get uploaded to any server. Instead, the sender’s computer becomes the server. Traditional ways of sending files, like in an email or using a cloud hosting service, require trusting the service with access to the files being shared.
  • Network eavesdroppers can’t spy on files in transit. Because connections between Tor onion services and Tor Browser are end-to-end encrypted, no network attackers can eavesdrop on the shared files while the recipient is downloading them. If the eavesdropper is positioned on the sender’s end, the recipient’s end, or is a malicious Tor node, they will only see Tor traffic. If the eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the recipient’s Tor client with the sender’s onion service, the traffic will be encrypted using the onion service key.
  • Anonymity of sender and recipient are protected by Tor. OnionShare and Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the sender anonymously communicates the OnionShare URL with the recipient, the recipient and eavesdroppers can’t learn the identity of the sender.
  • If an attacker enumerates the onion service, the shared files remain safe. There have been attacks against the Tor network that can enumerate onion services. If someone discovers the .onion address of an OnionShare onion service, they still cannot download the shared files without knowing the slug. The slug is generated by choosing two random words from a list of 6800 words, meaning there are 6800^2, or about 46 million possible slugs. But they can only make 20 wrong guesses before OnionShare stops the server, preventing brute force attacks against the slug. The OnionShare server also checks request URIs using a constant time string comparison function, so timing attacks can’t be used to help guess the slug.

What it doesn’t protect against

  • Communicating the OnionShare URL might not be secure. The sender is responsible for securely communicating the OnionShare URL with the recipient. If they send it insecurely (such as through an email message, and their email is being monitored by an attacker), the eavesdropper will learn that they’re sending files with OnionShare. If the attacker loads the URL in Tor Browser before the legitimate recipient gets to it, they can download the files being shared. If this risk fits the sender’s threat model, they must find a more secure way to communicate the URL, such as in an encrypted email, chat, or voice call. This isn’t necessary in cases where the files being shared aren’t secret.
  • Communicating the OnionShare URL might not be anonymous. While OnionShare and Tor Browser allow for anonymously sending files, if the sender wishes to remain anonymous they must take extra steps to ensure this while communicating the OnionShare URL. For example, they might need to use Tor to create a new anonymous email or chat account, and only access it over Tor, to use for sharing the URL. This isn’t necessary in cases where there’s no need to protect anonymity, such as coworkers who know each other sharing work documents.

Building OnionShare

Start by getting a copy of the source code:
git clone https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare.git
cd onionshare
For .deb-based distros (like Debian, Ubuntu, Linux Mint):
Then install the needed dependencies:
sudo apt-get install -y python3-flask python3-stem python3-pyqt5 python-nautilus
After that you can try both the CLI and the GUI version of OnionShare:
./install/scripts/onionshare
./install/scripts/onionshare-gui
A script to build a .deb package and install OnionShare easily is also provided for your convenience:
sudo apt-get install -y build-essential fakeroot python3-all python3-stdeb dh-python python-nautilus
./install/build_deb.sh
sudo dpkg -i deb_dist/onionshare_*.deb
Note that OnionShare uses stdeb to generate Debian packages, and python3-stdeb is not available in Ubuntu 14.04 (Trusty). Because of this, you can’t use the build_install.sh script to build the .deb file in versions of Ubuntu 14.04 and earlier. However, .deb files you build in later versions of Ubuntu will install and work fine in 14.04.
For .rpm-based distros (Red Hat, Fedora, CentOS):
sudo sudo dnf install -y rpm-build python3-flask python3-stem python3-qt5 nautilus-python
./install/build_rpm.sh
sudo yum install -y dist/onionshare-*.rpm
Depending on your distribution, you may need to use yum instead of dnf.
For ArchLinux:
There is a PKBUILD available here that can be used to install OnionShare.



Share:

Saturday, July 9, 2016

Snowden says It's a 'Dark Day for Russia' after Putin Signs Anti-Terror Law



snowden-russia-anti-terror-law
Whistleblower and ex-NSA employee Edward Snowden has criticized a new anti-terror law introduced on Thursday by Russian President Vladimir Putin, referring it as "repressive" and noting that it is a "dark day for Russia."

The new legislation signed by Putin would compel the country's telephone carriers and Internet providers to record and store the private communications of each and every one of their customers for six months – and turn them over to the government if requested.

The data collected on customers would include phone calls, text messages, photographs, and Internet activities that would be stored for six months, and "metadata" would be stored up to 3 years.
Moreover, Instant messaging services that make use of encryption, including WhatsApp, Telegram, and Viber, could face heavy fines of thousands of pounds if these services continue to operate in Russia without handing over their encryption keys to the government.

"Putin has signed a repressive new law that violates not only human rights but common sense. A dark day for Russia," Snowden wrote on Twitter.

Snowden is responsible for revealing global mass surveillance programs by leaking NSA classified documents back in June 2013 before finding asylum in Russia.

The activist explained that the new Russian law, in addition to "political and constitutional consequences," would cost telecommunications providers over $30 Billion to implement the new law, which is more than they can afford.

The CEO of Russia’s second-largest telecom company Megafon told a local newspaper Thursday that he would rather pay the government higher taxes than spend over $3 Billion yearly on infrastructure upgrades.
"Well be unable to fulfill the requirements of law in the way that it exists at present," said Megafon CEO Sergey Soldatenkov, adding that his company only generates an annual profit of $780 Million.

"When we saw the provisions of the bill, we really hoped that it will not be accepted. I believe we have done everything possible to inform deputies, Federation Council [and] the government that the bill in this form is impossible," Soldatenkov added.

A spokesperson for Tele2, another Russian telecom company, said it might have to raise prices threefold or more in order to accommodate the new law, The WSJ reported.

The Russian government will establish the precise requirements of the new legislation, according to the Kremlin website.

This frightening new legislation comes into force on July 20th.

Source: The Hackers News

OffensiveSec 2016
Share:

Monday, June 27, 2016

The Amnesic Incognito Live System - Tails 2.4




Tails is a live system that aims to preserve your privacy and anonymity. It helps you to use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship almost anywhere you go and on any computer but leaving no trace unless you ask it to explicitly.

It is a complete operating system designed to be used from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card independently of the computer's original operating system. It is Free Software and based on Debian GNU/Linux.

Tails comes with several built-in applications pre-configured with security in mind: web browser, instant messaging client, email client, office suite, image and sound editor, etc.


New features

  • We enabled the automatic account configuration of Icedove which discovers the correct parameters to connect to your email provider based on your email address. We improved it to rely only on secure protocol and we are working on sharing these improvements with Mozilla so that users of Thunderbird outside Tails can benefit from them as well.

Upgrades and changes

  • Update Tor Browser to 6.0.1, based on Firefox 45.
  • Remove the preconfigured #tails IRC channel. Join us on XMPP instead!
  • Always display minimize and maximize buttons in titlebars. (#11270)
  • Remove GNOME Tweak Tool and hledger. You can add them back using the Additional software packages persistence feature.
  • Use secure HKPS OpenPGP key server in Enigmail.
  • Harden our firewall by rejecting RELATED packets and restricting Tor to only send NEW TCP syn packets. (#11391)
  • Harden our kernel by:
    • Setting various security-related kernel options: slab_nomerge slub_debug=FZ mce=0 vsyscall=none. (#11143)
    • Removing the .map files of the kernel. (#10951)

Fixed problems

  • Update the DRM and Mesa graphical libraries. This should fix recent problems with starting Tails on some hardware. (#11303)
  • Some printers that stopped working in Tails 2.0 should work again. (#10965)
  • Enable Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for IPv4. This should make the connections to obfs4 Tor bridges more reliable. (#9268)
  • Fix the translations of Tails Upgrader. (#10221)
  • Fix displaying the details of a circuit in Onion Circuits when using Tor bridges. (#11195)
For more details, read our changelog.

Known issues

  • The automatic account configuration of Icedove freezes when connecting to some email providers. (#11486)
  • In some cases sending an email with Icedove results in the error: "The message could not be sent using Outgoing server (SMTP) mail.riseup.net for an unknown reason." When this happens, simply click "Ok" and try again and it should work. (#10933)
  • The update of the Mesa graphical library introduce new problems at least on AMD HD 7770 and nVidia GT 930M.


See the list of long-standing issues.




Share:

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Everything you Need to Safely Browse the Internet - Tor Browser 6.0




The Tor software protects you by bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical location, and it lets you access sites which are blocked.

The Tor Browser lets you use Tor on Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux without needing to install any software. It can run off a USB flash drive, comes with a pre-configured web browser to protect your anonymity, and is self-contained.

The Tor Browser Team is proud to announce the first stable release in the 6.0 series. This release is available from the Tor Browser Project page and also from our distribution directory.

This release brings us up to date with Firefox 45-ESR, which should mean a better support for HTML5 video on Youtube, as well as a host of other improvements.

Beginning with the 6.0 series code-signing for OS X systems is introduced. This should help our users who had trouble with getting Tor Browser to work on their Mac due to Gatekeeper interference. There were bundle layout changes necessary to adhere to code signing requirements but the transition to the new Tor Browser layout on disk should go smoothly.

The release also features new privacy enhancements and disables features where we either did not have the time to write a proper fix or where we decided they are rather potentially harmful in a Tor Browser context.


On the security side this release makes sure that SHA1 certificate support is disabled and our updater is not only relying on the signature alone but is checking the hash of the downloaded update file as well before applying it. Moreover, we provide a fix for a Windows installer related DLL hijacking vulnerability.

The full changelog since Tor Browser 5.5.5 is

Tor Browser 6.0 
  • All Platforms
    • Update Firefox to 45.1.1esr
    • Update OpenSSL to 1.0.1t
    • Update Torbutton to 1.9.5.4
      • Bug 18466: Make Torbutton compatible with Firefox ESR 45
      • Bug 18743: Pref to hide 'Sign in to Sync' button in hamburger menu
      • Bug 18905: Hide unusable items from help menu
      • Bug 16017: Allow users to more easily set a non-tor SSH proxy
      • Bug 17599: Provide shortcuts for New Identity and New Circuit
      • Translation updates
      • Code clean-up
    • Update Tor Launcher to 0.2.9.3
      • Bug 13252: Do not store data in the application bundle
      • Bug 18947: Tor Browser is not starting on OS X if put into /Applications
      • Bug 11773: Setup wizard UI flow improvements
      • Translation updates
    • Update HTTPS-Everywhere to 5.1.9
    • Update meek to 0.22 (tag 0.22-18371-3)
      • Bug 18371: Symlinks are incompatible with Gatekeeper signing
      • Bug 18904: Mac OS: meek-http-helper profile not updated
    • Bug 15197 and child tickets: Rebase Tor Browser patches to ESR 45
    • Bug 18900: Fix broken updater on Linux
    • Bug 19121: The update.xml hash should get checked during update
    • Bug 18042: Disable SHA1 certificate support
    • Bug 18821: Disable libmdns support for desktop and mobile
    • Bug 18848: Disable additional welcome URL shown on first start
    • Bug 14970: Exempt our extensions from signing requirement
    • Bug 16328: Disable MediaDevices.enumerateDevices
    • Bug 16673: Disable HTTP Alternative-Services
    • Bug 17167: Disable Mozilla's tracking protection
    • Bug 18603: Disable performance-based WebGL fingerprinting option
    • Bug 18738: Disable Selfsupport and Unified Telemetry
    • Bug 18799: Disable Network Tickler
    • Bug 18800: Remove DNS lookup in lockfile code
    • Bug 18801: Disable dom.push preferences
    • Bug 18802: Remove the JS-based Flash VM (Shumway)
    • Bug 18863: Disable MozTCPSocket explicitly
    • Bug 15640: Place Canvas MediaStream behind site permission
    • Bug 16326: Verify cache isolation for Request and Fetch APIs
    • Bug 18741: Fix OCSP and favicon isolation for ESR 45
    • Bug 16998: Disable <link rel="preconnect"> for now
    • Bug 18898: Exempt the meek extension from the signing requirement as well
    • Bug 18899: Don't copy Torbutton, TorLauncher, etc. into meek profile
    • Bug 18890: Test importScripts() for cache and network isolation
    • Bug 18886: Hide pocket menu items when Pocket is disabled
    • Bug 18703: Fix circuit isolation issues on Page Info dialog
    • Bug 19115: Tor Browser should not fall back to Bing as its search engine
    • Bug 18915+19065: Use our search plugins in localized builds
    • Bug 19176: Zip our language packs deterministically
    • Bug 18811: Fix first-party isolation for blobs URLs in Workers
    • Bug 18950: Disable or audit Reader View
    • Bug 18886: Remove Pocket
    • Bug 18619: Tor Browser reports "InvalidStateError" in browser console
    • Bug 18945: Disable monitoring the connected state of Tor Browser users
    • Bug 18855: Don't show error after add-on directory clean-up
    • Bug 18885: Disable the option of logging TLS/SSL key material
    • Bug 18770: SVGs should not show up on Page Info dialog when disabled
    • Bug 18958: Spoof screen.orientation values
    • Bug 19047: Disable Heartbeat prompts
    • Bug 18914: Use English-only label in <isindex/> tags
    • Bug 18996: Investigate server logging in esr45-based Tor Browser
    • Bug 17790: Add unit tests for keyboard fingerprinting defenses
    • Bug 18995: Regression test to ensure CacheStorage is disabled
    • Bug 18912: Add automated tests for updater cert pinning
    • Bug 16728: Add test cases for favicon isolation
    • Bug 18976: Remove some FTE bridges
  • Windows
  • OS X
    • Bug 6540: Support OS X Gatekeeper
    • Bug 13252: Tor Browser should not store data in the application bundle
    • Bug 18951: HTTPS-E is missing after update
    • Bug 18904: meek-http-helper profile not updated
    • Bug 18928: Upgrade is not smooth (requires another restart)
  • Build System
    • All Platforms
      • Bug 18127: Add LXC support for building with Debian guest VMs
      • Bug 16224: Don't use BUILD_HOSTNAME anymore in Firefox builds
      • Bug 18919: Remove unused keys and unused dependencies
    • Windows
      • Bug 17895: Use NSIS 2.51 for installer to avoid DLL hijacking
      • Bug 18290: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use
    • OS X
      • Bug 18331: Update toolchain for Firefox 45 ESR
      • Bug 18690: Switch to Debian Wheezy guest VMs
    • Linux
      • Bug 18699: Stripping fails due to obsolete Browser/components directory
      • Bug 18698: Include libgconf2-dev for our Linux builds
      • Bug 15578: Switch to Debian Wheezy guest VMs (10.04 LTS is EOL)

Share:

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

That's how we will resume the Internet - Edward Snowden




Through a telepresence robot, Edward Snowden speaks at TED2014 on surveillance and Internet freedom. The right to data privacy, he suggests, is not a partisan issue, but requires a fundamental reassessment of the role of the internet in our lives and the laws that protect it . "Your rights are important," he says, "because you never know when you 'll need them."Chris Anderson interview with special guest Tim Berners -Lee.





By OffensiveSec
Share:

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

Vuvuzela - Private Messaging System That Hides Metadata


Vuvuzela is a messaging system that protects the privacy of message contents and message metadata. Users communicating through Vuvuzela do not reveal who they are talking to, even in the presence of powerful nation-state adversaries. Our SOSP 2015 paper explains the system, its threat model, performance, limitations, and more. Our SOSP 2015 slides give a more graphical overview of the system. 

Vuvuzela is the first system that provides strong metadata privacy while scaling to millions of users. Previous systems that hide metadata using Tor (such as Pond ) are prone to traffic analysis attacks. Systems that encrypt metadata using techniques like DC-nets and PIR don't scale beyond thousands of users.

Vuvuzela uses efficient cryptography ( NaCl ) to hide as much metadata as possible and adds noise to metadata that can't be encrypted efficiently. This approach provides less privacy than encrypting all of the metadata, but it enables Vuvuzela to support millions of users. Nonetheless, Vuvuzela adds enough noise to thwart adversaries like the NSA and guarantees differential privacy for users' metadata.

Screenshots

A conversation in the Vuvuzela client

In practice, the message latency would be around 20s to 40s, depending on security parameters and the number of users connected to the system.

Noise generated by the Vuvuzela servers

Vuvuzela is unable to encrypt two kinds of metadata: the number of idle users (connected users without a conversation partner) and the number of active users (users engaged in a conversation). Without noise, a sophisticated adversary could use this metadata to learn who is talking to who. However, the Vuvuzela servers generate noise that perturbs this metadata so that it is difficult to exploit.

Usage
Follow these steps to run the Vuvuzela system locally using the provided sample configs.
  1. Install Vuvuzela (assuming GOPATH=~/go , requires Go 1.4 or later):
    $ go get github.com/davidlazar/vuvuzela/...
    The remaining steps assume PATH contains ~/go/bin and that the current working directory is ~/go/src/github.com/davidlazar/vuvuzela .
  2. Start the last Vuvuzela server:
    $ vuvuzela-server -conf confs/local-last.conf
  3. Start the middle server (in a new shell):
    $ vuvuzela-server -conf confs/local-middle.conf
  4. Start the first server (in a new shell):
    $ vuvuzela-server -conf confs/local-first.conf
  5. Start the entry server (in a new shell):
    $ vuvuzela-entry-server -wait 1s
  6. Run the Vuvuzela client:
    $ vuvuzela-client -conf confs/alice.conf
The client supports these commands:
  • /dial <user> to dial another user
  • /talk <user> to start a conversation
  • /talk <yourself> to end a conversation

Deployment considerations
This Vuvuzela implementation is not ready for wide-use deployment. In particular, we haven't yet implemented these crucial components:
  • Public Key Infrastructure : Vuvuzela assumes the existence of a PKI in which users can privately learn each others public keys. This implementation uses pki.conf as a placeholder until we integrate a real PKI.
  • CDN to distribute dialing dead drops :Vuvuzela's dialing protocol (used to initiate conversations) uses a lot of server bandwidth. To make dialing practical, Vuvuzela should use a CDN or BitTorrent to distribute the dialing dead drops.
There is a lot more interesting work to do. See the issue tracker for more information.


Share:
Copyright © Offensive Sec Blog | Powered by OffensiveSec
Design by OffSec | Theme by Nasa Records | Distributed By Pirate Edition